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RESCUING MARYLAND TORT LAW:  
A TRIBUTE TO JUDGE SALLY ADKINS 
DONALD G. GIFFORD* 
This is an unconventional tribute.  I have never worked closely with 
Judge Sally Adkins.  Indeed, if my memory is correct, my contact with her 
has been limited to a couple of personal conversations, separated by approx-
imately a quarter-century, and three telephone conversations, two of which 
focused on her selection of judicial clerks.  However, during the past five 
years, when teaching Torts and related courses at the University of Maryland 
Carey School of Law, I frequently praised her work.  My students read her 
opinions; opinions that stand out among Maryland torts jurisprudence be-
cause they uniquely echo and respond to changes in tort law that swept most 
of the remainder of American jurisdictions between 1965 and 1985 but had 
previously been ignored by the Maryland courts. 
Not even a torts professor like me could have “foreseen” that Judge Ad-
kins would emerge as my personal judicial heroine.  Her pre-bench legal 
practice in Salisbury, Maryland, rarely involved tort matters.  As expected, 
her opinions in torts cases while a member of the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland were often fact-specific and faithfully applied the law of prece-
dents from the Court of Appeals of Maryland.1  Even in her early years on 
the Court of Appeals, her opinions in torts cases2 gave little hint of the 
groundbreaking decisions that would follow. 
I.  MARYLAND TORT LAW: LEGAL HISTORY IN PRESENT TIME 
However surprising it may be that Judge Adkins would author several 
of the most important Maryland tort opinions in recent decades, the structure 
of the ex-ante tort law that Judge Adkins began to transform was even more 
shocking.  It is commonly—and mistakenly—assumed that predominantly 
Democratic and liberal leaning states such as Maryland would have tort law 
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 1.  See, e.g., Lapides v. Trabbic, 134 Md. App. 51, 758 A.2d 1114 (2000); Piper v. Layman, 
125 Md. App. 745, 726 A.2d 887 (1999). 
 2.  See, e.g., Prince George’s Cty. v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859 (2011); Houghton v. 
Forrest, 412 Md. 578, 989 A.2d 223 (2010). 
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that favors plaintiffs and the ability of plaintiffs’ counsel to have their cases 
heard and decided by juries.3 
The reality of Maryland tort law is different.  A study that sociologist 
Dr. Brian Jones and I published in 2016 found that tort doctrines in Maryland 
were among the most restrictive in enabling plaintiffs’ counsel to have their 
cases decided by juries, ranking Maryland behind only Virginia and slightly 
ahead of Alabama among the seventeen states we studied.4  Other jurisdic-
tions experienced dramatic pro-plaintiff changes in personal injury law be-
tween the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, but Maryland remained an isolated 
outlier.5  The anachronistic characteristics of Maryland tort law are perva-
sive.6  Perhaps most notorious is the Court of Appeals’s continuing recogni-
tion of contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery, a doctrine rejected 
by forty-five other states.7  Other aberrant and harsh features of Maryland 
tort law abound.  For example, the Court of Appeals rejects the attractive 
nuisance doctrine and any other amelioration of the harsh doctrine that a child 
trespasser is owed only a duty to avoid willful, wanton, or reckless conduct 
on the part of the landowner.8 
At the close of the twentieth century, two of the Court of Appeals’s po-
sitions most out-of-line with those of almost all other jurisdictions involved 
the fundamental issue of how duty is determined in a tort case and the doc-
trine of negligence per se.  First and most notably, Maryland law made it far 
easier for judges to keep cases from being heard by a jury by deciding as a 
matter of law that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff than did virtu-
ally any other state, with the possible exception of Virginia.9  Second, Mar-
yland courts rejected the doctrine of negligence per se,10 adopted in a “strong 
majority” of all states,11 that provided that when a defendant violated a spe-
cific statutory obligation designed to protect a class of people among whom 
                                                          
 3.  See generally Donald G. Gifford & Brian Jones, Keeping Cases from Black Juries: An 
Empirical Analysis of How Race, Income Inequality, and Regional History Affect Tort Law, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016). 
 4.  Id. app. A at 635–36.  
 5.  Id. at 560–61.  
 6.  Id. at 563–64; see also Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning Lia-
bility in Maryland Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and Joint and Several Liabil-
ity, 73 MD. L. REV. 701, 701–02 (2014). 
 7.  See generally Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013); 
Gifford & Robinette, supra note 6. 
 8.  E.g., Osterman v. Peters, 260 Md. 313, 317–18, 272 A.2d 21, 23–24 (1971) (declining to 
adopt the doctrine of attractive nuisance to hold the landowners liable when a four-year-old boy fell 
into a neighbor’s swimming pool and drowned). 
 9.  See Gifford & Jones, supra note 3, at 615 tbl.1.  
 10.  See, e.g., Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 126, 90 A.3d 464, 479 (2014). 
 11.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14, cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010) (stating that only “[a]bout a dozen states conclude that violation of a statute is 
only some evidence of negligence”).  
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the injured plaintiff was a member from the type of harm that the plaintiff 
suffered, the defendant’s statutory violation established, either as a matter of 
law or as a presumption, that the defendant had breached a duty of reasonable 
care owed to the plaintiff.12 
Why would Maryland, a progressive state, adopt substantive tort princi-
ples making it more difficult for plaintiffs to have their cases heard by the 
jury?  During the past twenty-seven years, as a dean and professor of torts at 
the law school, I listened as defense insurance attorneys and business leaders 
told me of the importance of finding ways “to keep cases from Baltimore 
juries.”  In my study with Dr. Jones, we found that the prevalence of torts 
doctrines that keep plaintiffs’ cases from being heard by juries is correlated 
with two factors: (1) the percentage of black jurors in the largest urban areas 
of a state and (2) a state’s history as part of the slaveholding South during the 
antebellum era.13  Based on the common perception, at least among defense 
attorneys and business leaders, that urban juries engaged in wealth redistri-
bution, we also tested whether there was a correlation between the degree to 
which a state’s substantive tort law kept cases from juries and the degree of 
income inequality within that state’s largest cities, but we found no such cor-
relation.14  In other words, keeping cases from Bronx (and Baltimore) juries15 
results from race, not poverty. 
In any event, as late as 2013, Maryland’s tort law retained many of the 
same anti-plaintiff, anti-jury doctrines that the overwhelming majority of 
other jurisdictions discarded between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s.  
Then, Judge Adkins assumed a leadership role in bringing Maryland tort law 
closer to prevailing national norms. 
II.  JUDGE ADKINS: THE EVOLUTION OF DUTY UNDER MARYLAND LAW 
A.  The Power of Dissent: Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC 
At times, the opinions that are most important are dissenting opinions.  
Such was the case when Judge Adkins wrote the dissenting opinion in Warr 
v. JMGM Group, LLC,16 the Court of Appeals 2013 decision finding that a 
tavern did not owe a duty of care to a child killed in an auto accident after the 
tavern had served its patron, Mr. Eaton, at least twenty-one drinks, many of 
                                                          
 12.  See generally Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889); Martin v. Herzog, 126 
N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920). 
 13.  Gifford & Jones, supra note 3, at 565. 
 14.  Id. at 590. 
 15.  In his novel, The Bonfire of the Vanities, Tom Wolfe characterized any jury in Bronx 
County, New York as a “vehicle for redistributing wealth.”  TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE 
VANITIES 406 (Picador 2008) (1987). 
 16.  433 Md. 170, 70 A.3d 347 (2013).  
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them after Eaton was visibly intoxicated.17  Subsequently, Eaton drove in 
excess of 90 mph and caused a collision killing a child and injuring other 
family members.18  Judge Adkins attacked the court’s failure to accept dram 
shop liability19 as poor social policy20 and as a decision totally out of line 
with judicial decisions in at least forty-one other states.21  My analysis and 
comments here, however, focus on what Judge Adkins described as the “vi-
olence [done] to the tort of negligence which will have far ranging conse-
quences, well beyond the issue of dram shop liability.”22 
Judge Adkins’s dissenting opinion is essentially a tutorial in how the 
law in Maryland governing duty is dramatically at odds with the law in vir-
tually all other jurisdictions23 and as expressed in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts.24  The majority holds that the defendant-tavern did not owe a duty of 
care to the plaintiffs and purports to justify its opinion by an analysis of var-
ious provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.25  In her dissent, Judge 
Adkins eviscerates the majority’s reasoning.26 
The plaintiffs in Warr alleged that the defendant’s employees continued 
to serve Mr. Eaton alcoholic beverages after he was visibly intoxicated and 
in doing so, violated both a criminal statute and a duty owed to the plaintiffs 
to “‘not furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons,’ which caused their inju-
ries.”27  The majority states that whether there is a duty “is generally deter-
mined by examining a number of factors, to include:” 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty 
that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral 
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing 
                                                          
 17.  Id. at 199–200, 70 A.3d at 365 (Adkins, J., dissenting).  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See id. at 202, 70 A.3d at 366 (majority opinion) (defining “dram shop liability” as “[c]ivil 
liability of a commercial seller of alcoholic beverages for personal injury caused by an intoxicated 
customer” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (9th ed. 2009))). 
 20.  Id. at 204, 230–33, 70 A.3d at 367, 383–85 (Adkins, J., dissenting).  
 21.  Id. at 244 n.33, 70 A.3d at 391 n.33.   
 22.  Id. at 253, 70 A.3d at 396; see also Katherine O’Konski, Note, Warr v. JMGM Group: 
Maryland Dram Shops Escape Duty to Foreseeable Victims of Drunk Driving, 73 MD. L. REV. 1206 
(2014).  This note contains an excellent student analysis of the Warr decision; I am proud to 
acknowledge that I was one of the faculty members who assisted Ms. O’Konski in the development 
of her thesis.  Id. 
 23.  O’Konski, supra note 22, at 1210 (“Although Maryland declined to adopt dram shop lia-
bility in the 1980s, many other states recognized that taverns owed a duty to protect others from 
foreseeable injury at the hands of their intoxicated patrons.”). 
 24.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010); see also infra notes 36–49.  
 25.  Warr, 433 Md. at 184, 190–95, 70 A.3d at 355, 359–62.  
 26.  See id. at 253, 70 A.3d at 396 (Adkins, J., dissenting).  
 27.  Id. at 174, 70 A.3d at 349 (majority opinion).  
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future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with 
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and preva-
lence of insurance for the risk involved.28 
Additionally, the majority writes that where the injury is more directly 
caused by a third-party (Eaton), the original tortfeasor (the tavern) owes “no 
duty to an injured person for harm caused by a third party” unless the tortfea-
sor either has control over the actions of the third party or has a special rela-
tionship with the victim.29 
Judge Adkins carefully and convincingly explains how the majority 
misunderstands the law of duty as applied in the Restatements, the beginning 
text for the majority’s analysis.  She notes that the rules that apply to whether 
the defendant owes a duty of care begin with whether a defendant is engaged 
in affirmative conduct or whether a defendant is merely being unreasonable 
by not coming to the aid of a stranger whose peril the defendant did not cre-
ate.30  Judge Adkins is exceedingly careful in making it clear that the real 
distinction is whether the defendant’s “conduct . . . results in greater risk to 
another than the other would have faced absent the conduct” and that “[t]his 
‘greater risk’ includes ‘risk by exposing another to the improper conduct of 
third parties.’”31 
As Judge Adkins explicitly states in a bolded heading in her opinion, 
titled “Majority Applies Wrong Standard,”32 the majority’s holding rests on 
the statement within Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which 
essentially provides “that—absent a special relationship—an individual has 
no duty to prevent a third person from causing harm to another.”33  However, 
as Judge Adkins notes, “Section 315 is found within the ‘Duties of Affirma-
tive Action’ topic of the Second Restatement.”34  It does not apply at all when 
a defendant is acting affirmatively—or, more precisely, when the defendant’s 
conduct increases the risk to the plaintiff, including increasing the risk caused 
by third parties.35  In other words, when the tavern’s employees served alco-
hol to the visibly intoxicated Eaton, Section 315 does not apply at all.  Per-
haps we can blame it all on a computerized legal research error.  Using one 
                                                          
 28.  Id. at 182, 70 A.3d at 354 (quoting Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cty., 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 
A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986)).  
 29.  Id. at 189, 70 A.3d at 358. 
 30.  Id. at 205–06, 210, 70 A.3d at 368, 371 (Adkins, J., dissenting).  
 31.  Id. at 207, 70 A.3d at 369 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & 
EMOT. HARM § 7 cmt. o (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
 32.  Id. at 208, 70 A.3d at 370.  
 33.  Id. at 209, 70 A.3d at 370 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1965)). 
 34.  Id. at 209, 70 A.3d at 371.  
 35.  Id. at 210, 70 A.3d at 371. 
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of the electronic legal research services such as Westlaw or LEXIS, the judge 
or her law clerk evidently took Section 315 entirely out of context and applied 
it to a situation in which the defendant’s employee, the bartender, was already 
acting affirmatively. 
As egregious and sloppy as the majority’s error in applying the concept 
of special relationship to a situation in which it is not relevant, the majority’s 
analysis also differs more fundamentally from the law of duty as expressed 
in the Restatements and the overwhelming percentage of jurisdictions.36  At 
least since Judge Cardozo’s iconic opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co.,37 and perhaps even before then,38 virtually all other jurisdictions have 
held that a defendant owes a duty of care to anyone whom it could foresee 
might be injured by its negligence.39  In contrast, the majority opinion in 
Warr recites a list of factors from Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia,40 that it asserts must be examined in every case to determine whether 
a duty is owed by the defendant.41  This interpretation of the California Su-
preme Court’s analysis of duty in Tarasoff is entirely mistaken.  In Tarasoff, 
the court quotes with approval the classic language of Heaven v. Pender,42 
providing essentially that when a defendant’s conduct foreseeably results in 
harm to others, a duty exists.43  The Tarasoff court then goes on to state, “We 
depart from ‘this fundamental principle’ only upon the ‘balancing of a num-
ber of considerations,’”44 the same factors identified earlier in this Section45  
that the Warr majority indicated should be considered in deciding whether a 
duty exists in the first place under Maryland law.46  Similarly, Section 7 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, 
after stating that “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care 
                                                          
 36.  Id. at 243, 70 A.3d at 391. 
 37.  111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).  
 38.  See, e.g., Heaven v. Pender, 11 QBD 503 (1883) (stating “whenever one person is by cir-
cumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who 
did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct 
with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the 
other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger”).  
 39.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010) (going even further and recognizing that “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm;” in other words, the actor 
need not foresee the risk).   
 40.  551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).   
 41.  Warr, 433 Md. at 182, 70 A.3d at 354; see supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 42.  11 QBD 503 (1883). 
 43.  Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342 (quoting Heaven, 11 QBD at 509); see supra note 22 and accom-
panying text.   
 44.  Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334.  
 45.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 46.  Warr, 433 Md. at 182, 70 A.3d at 354 (quoting Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cty., 306 Md. 
617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986)). 
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when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm,” goes on to make 
the same point as the court in Tarasoff: “In exceptional cases, when an artic-
ulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liabil-
ity in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no 
duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”47 
Despite the Maryland Court of Appeals’s continued reference and reli-
ance on the Tarasoff factors, the difference between how the court uses the 
factors and how the California Supreme Court and the Restatement employ 
them is profound.  In the vast bulk of other American jurisdictions, foresee-
ability alone creates the duty when the defendant is acting affirmatively (or, 
as Judge Adkins would correct me, “increasing the risk” through its con-
duct).48  In Maryland, the Court of Appeals states that the court must examine 
these same Tarasoff factors to determine whether a duty is owed in the first 
place.49  When it comes to duty, in Maryland, the presumption is flipped.  
Why?  This virtually unique formulation of duty analysis gives Maryland trial 
courts the opportunity to keep cases from “Baltimore” juries. 
Judge Adkins dissenting opinion in Warr is the first Court of Appeals 
opinion in recent years, and perhaps much longer, that seriously examines 
some of the differences between how duty is determined under Maryland law 
and under the law that operates in the overwhelming percentage of other ju-
risdictions.  Her analysis was in a losing effort, but it set the stage for im-
portant Court of Appeals decisions to come—notably May v. Air & Liquid 
Systems Corp.50 and, especially, Kiriakos v. Phillips.51 
B.  Pushing the Envelope of Duty: Imposing Liability on a 
Manufacturer that Did Not Produce the Product 
In the two years following Warr, Judge Adkins wrote for a majority of 
the Court of Appeals in two opinions that probably extend duty farther than 
any other decisions issued by the court in recent decades.  At the same time, 
the doctrinal articulation of duty under Maryland law moved, but only incre-
mentally, toward the test of duty employed in most other jurisdictions. 
In May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., the plaintiff’s decedent (“May”) 
died of mesothelioma, a particularly virulent form of cancer almost always 
resulting from exposure to asbestos.52  His wife sued the defendant, the man-
ufacturer of steam pumps installed in naval vessels that contained asbestos 
                                                          
 47.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010) (emphasis added). 
 48.  Warr, 433 Md. at 185, 70 A.3d at 356. 
 49.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
 50.  446 Md. 1, 129 A.3d 984 (2015); see infra Section I.B.  
 51.  448 Md. 440, 139 A.3d 1006 (2016); see infra Section I.C.   
 52.  May, 446 Md. at 7, 129 A.3d at 987.  
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gaskets and packing.53  The defendant’s instruction manual lacked any warn-
ing “regarding the danger of inhaling asbestos dust or directions to wear pro-
tective gear.”54  However, May was not exposed to asbestos gaskets and 
packing that the defendant had incorporated into the product it sold.  Instead, 
May’s exposure had been to replacement gaskets and packing, produced by 
other manufacturers, that were later installed in the pumps originally manu-
factured by the defendant.55  During the years when May inhaled the asbestos 
fibers from the gaskets and packing materials, the only insulating material 
available that could withstand the high temperatures present in the pumps 
contained asbestos.56 
When the plaintiff sued the defendant, the manufacturer of the original 
pump, under both negligence and strict liability failure to warn claims, the 
defendant quite understandably argued that it owed no duty to the plaintiff’s 
decedent because it had not manufactured the asbestos gaskets and packing 
that caused his harm.57  Judge Adkins analyzed the duty issue using the same 
six factors that the court had described in Warr.58  Now, however, Judge Ad-
kins, while acknowledging that “foreseeability alone is not sufficient to es-
tablish a duty,”59 stated clearly that “the principal determinant of duty is fore-
seeability.”60 
Admittedly, the case in which this advance occurred is the type of case 
that draws the wrath of commentators from the defense side who argue, par-
ticularly on the strict liability claim,  that a manufacturer is being held liable 
for a product it did not produce.61  Arguably, being held liable on the strict 
                                                          
 53.  Id. at 5–7, 129 A.3d at 986–87.  
 54.  Id. at 6, 129 A.3d at 987.  
 55.  Id. at 6–7, 9–10, 129 A.3d at 986–87, 989. 
 56.  Id. at 6, 129 A.3d at 986. 
 57.  Id. at 11, 129 A.3d at 989–90. 
 58.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 59.  May, 446 Md. at 12, 129 A.3d at 990.   
 60.  Id. at 18, 129 A.3d at 994.  The opinion, written by Judge Adkins, also holds that the man-
ufacturer can be held liable on a strict liability basis.  Id. at 26, 28–29, 129 A.3d at 989–1000.  See 
infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.  In an opinion written by Justice Kavanaugh and joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the United States 
Supreme Court recently reached a similar conclusion in a case with facts virtually identical to those 
in May.  See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 991 (2019) (“In the maritime tort 
context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product requires incorporation of a 
part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be 
dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s 
users will realize that danger.”).   
 61.  See PHIL GOLDBERG, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., SHOWDOWN IN ALABAMA: 
LITIGATORS VS. INNOVATORS 1 (2015), https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/09/2015.09-Goldberg_Showdown-in-Alabama-Litigators-vs-Innovators.pdf (“Every 
once in a while, personal injury lawyers come up with new ways to sue that can be real head scratch-
ers. . . .  This happened last year in Alabama, where the Alabama Supreme Court held that a com-
pany can be subject to liability, not for its own products, but for products entirely made and sold by 
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products liability claim can be justified on the grounds that the manufacturer 
sold the original pump without warning of the dangers of inhaling asbestos 
fibers resulting from the presence of asbestos gaskets and packing materials 
inherently necessary for the product to function.62 
The questionable holding on strict liability should not obscure the im-
portance or the soundness of Judge Adkins’s conclusion that a duty exists 
under the negligence claim.  Her ability to gain the votes for her majority 
opinion of five of the seven members of the court63 is surprising given that 
her dissent in Warr was joined by only two other judges.64  More important, 
foreseeability was now the “principal”—if not the only—factor determining 
liability.65 
C.  Take II of the Liability of Providers of Alcohol: Kiriakos v. Phillips 
After the Court of Appeals rejected dram shop liability in Warr, few 
observers would have predicted that the court would accept social host lia-
bility only three years later.  More jurisdictions accept dram shop liability 
than do social host liability.66  Restaurants and bars train their bartenders and 
servers as to how to detect underage patrons or signs that a customer has had 
too much to drink; individuals hosting parties in their own homes rarely if 
ever undergo such training.67  Commercial establishments are able to distrib-
ute the losses resulting from liability judgments for damages resulting from 
traffic accidents caused by their underage or visibly intoxicated patrons, 
through either insurance or incrementally increasing prices for the serving of 
                                                          
its competitors.” (referring to Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 673–74 (Ala. 2014) (allowing 
the plaintiff to recover against a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer even though the drugs 
that harmed him were generic drugs produced by a different manufacturer))).  
 62.  May, 446 Md. at 28–29, 129 A.3d at 1000. 
 63.  Judge Adkins’s opinion was joined by Chief Judge Barbera, Judge Greene, Judge McDon-
ald, and Judge Harrell.  Judge Battaglia and Judge Watts dissented.  See id. at 30, 129 A.3d at 1001 
(Watts, J., dissenting). 
 64.  Judge Harrell and Judge McDonald joined Judge Adkins’s dissent.  See Warr v. JMGM 
Grp., LLC, 433 Md. 170, 199, 70 A.3d 347, 365 (2013) (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 65.  See May, 446 Md. at 18, 129 A.3d at 994. 
 66.  Thirty-one states impose social host liability in civil suits following injuries or damages 
caused by underage drinkers.  Heather Morton, Social Host Liability for Underage Drinking Stat-
utes, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/financial-services-and-commerce/social-host-liability-for-underage-drinking-statutes.aspx.  
Forty states impose liability for dram shops.  Krystyna D. Gancoss, Note, “I’m Not a Regular 
Mom . . . I’m a Cool Mom”: An Argument for Broader Civil Social Host Liability in Connecticut, 
35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 351, 365 (2017).  
 67.  Cf. MD. CODE ANN., AL. BEV. § 4-505 (West 2016) (requiring an owner of a restaurant or 
bar licensed to serve alcoholic beverages, or their employee, to attend state-approved program on 
alcohol awareness, including “effective methods to . . . determine whether a customer is under the 
legal drinking age . . . [and] stop service before a customer becomes intoxicated”).  
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alcoholic beverages, in ways that often are not available to those who serve 
alcohol to their social guests in their homes and apartments. 
Despite all this, in Kiriakos v. Phillips, the Court of Appeals, in an opin-
ion written by Judge Adkins, unanimously imposed social host liability in 
two companion cases.68  The court distinguished Kiriakos from Warr in two 
ways.  First, the Maryland statute involved in Kiriakos makes it illegal for a 
defendant to allow a guest, whom he knows is underage, to drink alcoholic 
beverages on his property.69  Judge Adkins characterizes “[t]his prohibi-
tion . . . as a bright line.”70  In contrast, the statute in Warr made it illegal for 
a tavern to serve alcoholic beverages “to an adult who was ‘visibly intoxi-
cated.’”71  The judge concluded that “[t]he point at which a patron becomes 
‘visibly intoxicated’ is a point about which reasonable minds could differ.”72  
Perhaps this contrast is superficially plausible.  Yet, how realistic is it to ex-
pect that a social host will check the IDs of dozens of partygoers in their late 
teens or early twenties?  Is implementing such a requirement for social hosts 
really more feasible than expecting properly trained employees of bars and 
restaurants to be able to determine if a patron is visibly intoxicated? 
The second way in which Judge Adkins’s opinion distinguishes Warr is 
by stressing repeatedly that the Maryland legislature had evinced a special 
concern for the vulnerability of underage drinkers by passing the criminal 
statute making it illegal to serve alcoholic beverages to those under twenty-
one years of age.73  The court’s opinion repeatedly states that when the leg-
islature enacted the statute prohibiting the serving of alcoholic beverages to 
those under twenty-one years of age, it had expressed a policy of showing 
special solicitude for minors, recognizing both their inability to make mature 
decisions and their vulnerability to the effects of alcohol.74   
Judge Adkins’s distinguishing of Warr demonstrates her persuasive and 
diplomatic efforts to gain the votes necessary for a unanimous decision, in-
cluding that of Judge Battaglia who wrote the court’s opinion in Warr.  In 
objective terms, however, the attempt to distinguish the two cases is not 
                                                          
 68.  Kiriakos v. Phillips, 448 Md. 440, 139 A.3d 1006 (2016).  
 69.  See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-117 (West 2016).  
 70.  Kiriakos, 448 Md. at 491, 139 A.3d at 1036.  
 71.  Id. (quoting Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 443 Md. 170, 195, 70 A.3d 347, 362 (2013)). 
 72.  Id. at 491, 139 A.3d at 1036. 
 73.  CRIM. LAW § 10-117; Kiriakos, 448 Md. at 459–60, 139 A.3d at 1019. 
 74.  E.g., Kiriakos, 448 Md. at 460, 139 A.3d at 1018 (“CR § 10-117(b) identifies a specific 
class that the General Assembly sought to protect: underage people exposed to alcohol.  The text of 
the statute makes clear to us the General Assembly’s concern for this specific class.”); id. at 475, 
139 A.3d at 1027 (“[W]e also identify a legislative recognition that minors . . . have a reduced ability 
to handle alcohol.”); id. at 477, 139 A.3d at 1029 (“[T]he General Assembly’s determination that 
underage persons have a diminished ability to handle alcohol . . . .”); id. at 488, 139 A.3d at 1035 
(“Considering the legislative recognition in Maryland that underage people have a diminished abil-
ity to handle alcohol and may expose themselves and others to harm . . . .”).  
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wholly convincing, as I suspect Judge Adkins, who, of course, dissented in 
Warr, realized.  First, just as minors are unable to make mature decisions 
about the consumption of alcohol, so are those who are already visibly intox-
icated.  Second, the opinion attributes to the legislature a special solicitude 
for minors.  These statements blur the distinction between the intoxicated 
driver and the victim of the accident.  Ironically, the decedent in Warr75 was 
a child, and the decedent in Kiriakos was an adult.76 
Presumably, the tavern that serves an underaged patron should be just 
as liable as the social host in Kiriakos.  How long can Warr survive as prec-
edent if a tavern is held liable for serving an alcoholic beverage to a twenty-
year old with a realistic-looking fake ID but is not held liable for serving 
more than twenty alcoholic beverages to someone “visibly intoxicated,” as 
the defendant’s tavern did for Eaton in Kiriakos? 
Yes, the issues in the two cases are modestly different.  However, what 
really matters for the development of the common law of negligence in Mar-
yland is how Judge Adkins in Kiriakos assumed leadership of the court on 
the issue of duty.  I will be brief in addressing the duty issue in Dankos v. 
Stapf,77 the first of the two companion cases considered in the Kiriakos opin-
ion.  In that case, the defendant Linda Stapf allowed seventeen-year old Ste-
ven Dankos to drink alcoholic beverages at her home.78  Dankos left Stapf’s 
home early the next morning, riding in the bed of a pickup truck driven by 
another intoxicated partygoer who was twenty-two years of age.79  When the 
driver crashed the truck, Dankos was killed.  His mother sued Stapf, among 
others.80 
Judge Adkins’s opinion in the Dankos case applies the “Statute or Or-
dinance rule,” described and analyzed in the next Part,81 to find that Stapf 
owed Dankos a duty of care under the Maryland criminal statute making it 
illegal for adults to enable someone less than twenty-years of age to consume 
alcoholic beverages.82  She concludes that the statute’s legislative history 
shows a legislative purpose to protect “underage non-drivers who are pro-
vided alcohol” as well as those who become intoxicated and drive.83  She 
further finds that a jury could find that the statutory violation was a proximate 
                                                          
 75.  Warr, 433 Md. at 200, 70 A.3d at 365 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 76.  Kiriakos, 448 Md. at 452–53, 139 A.3d at 1014.  
 77.  Davis v. Stapf, 224 Md. App. 393, 120 A.3d 890, cert. granted sub nom. Dankos v. Stapf, 
445 Md. 4, 122 A.3d 974 (2015). 
 78.  Id. at 451–52, 139 A.3d at 1012–13. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See infra Part III. 
 82.  Kiriakos v. Phillips, 448 Md. 440, 462–64, 139 A.3d 1006, 1014–16, 1020 (2016). 
 83.  Id. at 464, 139 A.3d at 1020.  
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cause of Dankos’s death because “Steven’s ‘degree of intoxication’ inhibited 
his ability to make a reasonable decision about how to leave the party.”84 
Judge Adkins’s handling of the case of Kiriakos is of far greater interest 
to the development of duty in negligence cases under Maryland law.85  In that 
case, eighteen-year-old Shetmiyah Robinson struck Manal Kiriakos, who 
was walking her dogs, causing her severe injuries.86  The previous evening, 
the defendant Brandon Phillips served Robinson alcoholic drinks.  The stat-
ute or ordinance rule does not provide the means of establishing duty because 
Kiriakos, an adult and presumably sober pedestrian, is not a part of the class 
designed to be protected by the statute.  Instead, Judge Adkins finds that Phil-
lips owed Kiriakos a duty under the common law of negligence by analogiz-
ing to the tort of negligent entrustment.87  She reasons that providing alco-
holic beverages to an underage minor is analogous to providing someone 
whom a defendant knows or should know to be incompetent to handle an 
automobile or a similar dangerous instrumentality because of his youth or 
incompetence.88 
Judge Adkins then confirms that Phillips owes Kiriakos a duty by ap-
plying the traditional Maryland test using the seven policy factors previously 
identified.89  She again highlights that “foreseeability is perhaps ‘most im-
portant’ among these factors,” but cautions that “it alone does not justify the 
imposition of a duty.”90  By finding a duty, of course, Judge Adkins reaches 
a result at least in tension and arguably directly at odds with the holding in 
Warr.91 
The importance of Judge Adkins’s opinions in May and Kiriakos is that 
she repeatedly stresses the “primacy” of foreseeability as a determinant of 
duty.  Maryland’s unusual handling of duty, employing a multifactorial test, 
which if employed without any indication as to which factor is most im-
portant or at least some indication has to how the factors should be weighted 
in a court’s analysis, is a virtual invitation for a trial court judge to decide the 
case backwards; that is, to decide whether or not a duty exists based on intu-
                                                          
 84.  Id., 139 A.3d at 1021. 
 85.  Id. at 452–54, 475–94, 139 A.3d at 1013–15, 1027–38.  
 86.  Id. at 452–53, 139 A.3d at 1014.  
 87.  In her dissent in Warr, Judge Adkins provided plaintiff’s counsel with a roadmap showing 
how to argue that providing alcoholic beverages to someone visibly intoxicated, or here a minor, 
was analogous to negligent entrustment.  Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 433 Md. 170, 224–25, 70 A.3d 
347, 379–80 (2013) (Adkins, J., dissenting).  
 88.  Kiriakos, 448 Md. at 452–53, 139 A.3d at 1014.  
 89.  Id. at 486–92, 139 A.3d at 1033–37; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
 90.  Kiriakos, 448 Md. at 486, 139 A.3d at 1034. 
 91.  See supra Section I.A.  
 2019] RESCUING MARYLAND TORT LAW 683 
itive judgment or political biases and then apply the articulated factors to jus-
tify whatever result is reached.  Judge Adkins’s focus on the primacy of fore-
seeability is a significant step in avoiding this. 
Maryland’s multifactorial test for duty also exacerbates the risk that trial 
court and appellate court judges, particularly those who may be skeptical of 
Baltimore or other urban juries, will inappropriately find “no duty” as a 
means to keep cases from the jury.  For example, in Georgia Pacific, LLC v. 
Farrar,92 the Court of Appeals held that the defendant that had manufactured 
a joint compound containing asbestos owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, 
the granddaughter of a worker exposed to the defendant’s asbestos-contain-
ing product, who regularly shook out and laundered his asbestos-laden work 
clothes.93  The court’s decision rested largely on two factors.  First, the court 
found that the risks of secondary exposure to asbestos by those in the work-
ers’ homes was not foreseeable to the defendant, even in the face of the trial 
court jury’s verdict for the plaintiff and the Court of Special Appeals’s find-
ing that the risks were foreseeable to the defendant.94  The Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that its own dubious factual finding was predicated not only 
on testimony in the trial record, but also by the court’s consideration of the 
facts in cases it had decided in the past and findings by courts in other juris-
dictions.95  In making this finding of fact, the court arguably invaded the 
province of the jury.  Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was not 
feasible for the defendant to warn victims of secondary exposure.96  Again, 
the court assumed responsibility for determining whether the defendant 
breached a duty of care; that is, was the burden of precaution greater than the 
probability of harm multiplied by the gravity of the resulting harm?97  A com-
ment to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emo-
tional Harm explicitly admonishes courts not to use the rubric of duty to keep 
cases from the jury, even in cases where a trial court might appropriately find 
that reasonable jurors could not find that a defendant breached a duty of care 
and, therefore, it would be appropriate for the court to issue judgment for the 
defendant as a matter of law.98 
                                                          
 92.  432 Md. 523, 69 A.3d 1028 (2013). 
 93.  Id. at 526, 69 A.3d at 1030–31. 
 94.  Id. at 530, 69 A.3d at 1032–33. 
 95.  Id. at 535–39, 69 A.3d at 1036–39. 
 96.  Id. at 531–32, 69 A.3d at 1033–34. 
 97.  See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (articulat-
ing Judge Learned Hand’s formula of whether the burden of precaution is less than the probability 
of the harm occurring multiplied by the gravity of the injury that may be caused as a test of negli-
gence).  
 98.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7, cmt. i (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010). 
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Judge Adkins has guided the Court of Appeals in a direction where fore-
seeability is the primary determinant of liability.  Now it is up to the court to 
finish the journey and adopt an approach to duty that is consistent with that 
in place in most other jurisdictions and in the Restatements: If a defendant 
acts negligently and can foresee that harm to others will occur as a result of 
its negligence, a duty of care is owed, at least to the class of people within 
the “range of apprehension”99 who might be foreseeably harmed.  When a 
defendant is acting affirmatively, the other six factors used by Maryland 
courts in recent decades to determine the existence of a duty should be limited 
to a more carefully defined role.  Their use should be restricted to determining 
whether “[i]n exceptional cases . . . a court may decide that the defendant has 
no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification” 
“when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or 
limiting liability in a particular class of cases.”100 
III.  THE STATUTE OR ORDINANCE RULE—NEGLIGENCE PER SE BY ANY 
OTHER NAME 
Changes in the law in a common law system where judges derive their 
authority to decide cases from the legitimacy of past precedents under the 
doctrine of stare decisis101 is difficult. Despite this, the most famous and im-
portant tort opinions of all time are those where judges purport to be follow-
ing precedent and yet, somehow, once the effects of the opinion are realized, 
it becomes clear that the common law has been turned upside down.  The 
classic example, of course, is Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s opinion in Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Company,102 in which the plaintiff was injured by a 
defective wheel, a component part of an automobile allegedly negligently in-
spected by the defendant Buick Motor Company that assembled the car, but 
purchased by the plaintiff from an independent dealer.103  The law at the time 
was clear: a defendant who provided a product that subsequently injured a 
plaintiff owed no duty of care to the plaintiff unless privity, a direct contrac-
tual relationship, existed between the defendant and the plaintiff.104  New 
York courts had created exceptions to this harsh rule for products that were 
“imminently dangerous to life,” such as falsely labelled poisons, explosives, 
                                                          
 99.  Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100–01 (N.Y. 1928).  
 100.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7(b) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010). 
 101.  See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 6, at 711–12; see also Gifford & Jones, supra note 3, 
at 712–16. 
 102.  111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 103.  Id. at 1051. 
 104.  Id. at 1052–52. 
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and deadly weapons when they were negligently constructed or labeled.105  
Judge Cardozo purported to follow these precedents when he held that if any 
product is “reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently 
made,” then the product is imminently dangerous and, therefore, privity is 
not required.106  Judge Cardozo had replaced a requirement of privity to es-
tablish duty with a test of foreseeability.  Obviously, if a plaintiff has been 
injured and is suing for personal injury, it is easy to argue that the product is 
imminently dangerous. 
Judge Adkins employs the same sort of principled reasoning in Black-
burn Limited Partnership v. Paul.107  A toddler had drowned, causing severe 
anoxic brain injury, in a pool after apparently gaining access through a gate 
that was faulty and failed to comply with a county ordinance and state regu-
lations.108  Plaintiff’s counsel initial evaluation of the chances for success in 
the ensuing litigation could not have been optimistic.  In a case with remark-
ably similar facts a generation earlier, Osterman v. Peters,109 the Court of 
Appeals held that, because Maryland was one of only two states that contin-
ued to reject the attractive nuisance doctrine110 or a similar provision under 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts111 each of which provide that a child tres-
passer is owed a duty of reasonable care under some circumstances, the land-
owner owed no duty to a trespassing child “except to abstain from willful or 
wanton misconduct or entrapment.”112  Even if, somehow, a duty could be 
established, plaintiff’s counsel could not rely on the doctrine of negligence 
per se to prove that the defendant was negligent and had violated a standard 
of care because Maryland rejected the doctrine of negligence per se; in Mar-
yland, a violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation was only “mere[] ev-
idence” of negligence.113 
Notwithstanding that a literal, mechanical application of well-estab-
lished precedents seemed to suggest that the Court of Appeals could not hold 
                                                          
 105.  See id. at 1052 (emphasis added) (discussing Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852)). 
 106.  Id. at 1053. 
 107.  438 Md. 100, 90 A.3d 464 (2014).  For a remarkably astute and well-researched analysis 
of Blackburn, see Monica Basche, Note, Blackburn Limited Partnership v. Paul: The Birth of Mar-
yland’s Statute or Ordinance Rule and Its Ill-Defined “Targeted Class” Requirement, 74 MD. L. 
REV. 621 (2015).  I am proud to acknowledge that Ms. Basche was once my student and research 
assistant.  Following graduation, Ms. Basche clerked for Judge Adkins.  
 108.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 104–05, 90 A.3d at 466. 
 109.  260 Md. 313, 272 A.2d 21 (1971). 
 110.  Id. at 315, 272 A.2d at 22. 
 111.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 112.  Osterman, 260 Md. at 314, 272 A.2d at 22; see also Herring v. Christensen, 252 Md. 240, 
249 A.2d 718 (1969). 
 113.  See Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 553–54, 831 A.2d 6, 9–10 (2003) (“[T]he long 
established general rule in Maryland [is] that the violation of a statutory duty is only evidence of 
negligence, but does not establish negligence per se.”). 
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that the plaintiffs in Blackburn would be able to recover, Judge Adkins, writ-
ing for a unanimous court, did just that.  Like Judge Cardozo, she did not 
confront the court’s past decisions rejecting negligence per se frontally, as 
the California Supreme Court of the 1960s or 1970s might have done.114  Per-
haps reflecting the extremely cautious and conservative view “[t]hat judges 
can and do make new law on subjects not covered by previous decisions; but 
that judges cannot unmake old law, cannot even change an existing rule of 
‘judge-made’ law,”115 Judge Adkins did not adopt the doctrine of negligence 
per se followed in most jurisdictions,116 but instead labelled a new rule, the 
“statute or ordinance”117 rule, created from scraps and hints from earlier 
Court of Appeals decisions.118  The significance of the Blackburn opinion is 
two-fold.  First, it establishes that a duty of care is owed to members of the 
specific class intended to be protected by the statute or ordinance.119  For 
example, a duty other than merely refraining from willful and reckless mis-
conduct is owed to the child trespasser in the first place because the ordinance 
was designed to protect children from the type of harm that befell the toddler.  
Second, the defendant’s violation of the standard expressed in the ordinance 
establishes a prima facie case of negligence.120 
As sometimes happens, the significance of Blackburn is obscured by the 
idiosyncratic ways in which Maryland courts define legal terms.  The Court 
of Appeals has stated that “proof of a statutory violation, plaintiff’s member-
ship in the class of people designed to be protected by the statute, and causa-
tion, amount to prima facie evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.”121  
However, a sizeable minority of jurisdictions that purport to follow the doc-
trine of negligence per se regard it not as a doctrine establishing negligence 
as a matter of law, but as a doctrine establishing a rebuttable presumption of 
                                                          
 114.  E.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 
Inc, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).  
 115.  Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 344, 366 
(1914).  Professor Smith, writing during the time when legal formalism was the prevailing judicial 
doctrine, preferred another view of the judicial role: “That judges can and do make new law; and 
also can and do unmake old law; i.e., law previously laid down by themselves or by their judicial 
predecessors.”  Id.  
 116.  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 126, 90 A.3d 464, 479 (2014); see also supra 
note 11. 
 117.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 111–17, 90 A.3d at 470–74; see also Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 
467, 476, 869 A.2d 837, 843 (2005); Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 79, 835 A.2d 
616, 621 (2003). 
 118.  See Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621; Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 380, 100 
A. 510, 515 (1916). 
 119.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 126–28, 90 A.3d at 479–80. 
 120.  Id. at 128, 90 A.3d at 480. 
 121.  Polakoff, 385 Md. at 478, 869 A.2d at 844; see also Brooks, 378 Md. at 78–81, 84–85, 85 
n.5, 89, 835 A.2d at 620–25, 625 n.5, 627.  See generally Blackburn, 438 Md. at 100, 90 A.3d at 
464.  
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negligence.122  At least after Blackburn, the Court of Appeals has adopted 
what a number of other jurisdictions regard as negligence per se even if that 
court continues to claim that it rejects the doctrine.123 
Further, the court uses the term “prima facie” evidence of negligence 
differently than it is used elsewhere.  In Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.,124 a 
case that Judge Adkins relies on in Blackburn, the court constantly flips back 
and forth between saying that the statutory violation was “evidence of negli-
gence” and saying it was “prima facie evidence of negligence.”125  In Black-
burn, Judge Adkins quotes from an earlier case, Allen v. Dackman,126 and 
appears to equate “prima facie evidence” with “sufficient evidence to warrant 
the court in submitting the case to the jury on the question of . . . negli-
gence.”127  Prima facie evidence of negligence is more than evidence that 
should be submitted to the jury; it is evidence that is sufficient unless rebutted 
to allow a court to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of 
breach of duty.128  In any event, Judge Adkins’s consistent use of the term 
“prima facie evidence” in her articulation of the Statute or Ordinance Rule 
moves beyond the Court of Appeals’s prior intermingling of that term with 
the unadorned use of the term “evidence.”  As stated previously, once Judge 
Adkins describes the statute or ordinance rule as establishing a prima facie 
case of negligence, in effect, Maryland’s statute or ordinance rule looks re-
markably like the negligence per se doctrine followed by many other juris-
dictions. 
One other aspect of Blackburn is particularly noteworthy.  In articulat-
ing the requirements of the Statute or Ordinance Rule, Judge Adkins is care-
ful to make it clear that “a plaintiff must show . . . [a] violation of a statute or 
ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the 
                                                          
 122.  E.g., Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 277–78 (Mich. 1976) (stating that “while it has 
been said that violation of this statute constitutes negligence per se, . . . such presumption may be 
overcome”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14, 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Some states say that the violation of a statute creates a rebuttable 
presumption of negligence, or prima facie proof of negligence.  Since this Restatement allows neg-
ligence pre se to be rebutted by an adequate showing of excuse (see § 15), the position taken by 
these states is close to or congruent with this Restatement’s position.” (citations omitted)).   
 123.  Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 555, 831 A.2d 6, 11 (2003); Blackburn, 438 Md. at 
126, 90 A.3d at 479.  
 124.  378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003). 
 125.  Id. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621.  
 126.  413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216 (2010).  
 127.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 128, 90 A.3d at 480 (quoting Allen, 413 Md. at 144, 991 A.3d at 
1223).  
 128.  See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 390 (1949) (explaining that 
“‘prima facie’ or ‘presumptive’ evidence of negligence” is evidence “which defendant must meet 
or overcome”). 
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plaintiff.”129  One suspects that the reason for this was to gain the votes of 
her Court of Appeals colleagues who were concerned in Warr130 that holding 
the tavern liable for anyone on Maryland’s highways injured or killed by an 
intoxicated patron from the tavern would create indeterminate liability.131  
Judge Adkins went to extraordinary lengths in Blackburn to find evidence of 
such specific statutory purpose because in previous opinions, the Court of 
Appeals had refused to apply the reasoning now consolidated in the Statute 
or Ordinance Rule in cases in which an ordinance “was passed for the benefit 
of the public.”132  The plaintiff in Blackburn alleged violations of both Mar-
yland regulations and the Montgomery County Code.133  The applicable Mar-
yland regulation explicitly stated that its purpose was to “protect and promote 
the public health and safety of individuals at public spas and pools in Mary-
land” including “recreational pools.”134  Thus, the regulation itself defines 
the class protected by the regulation no more specifically than “the public . . . 
safety of individuals” who might be protected by dram shop statutes.135  
However, Judge Adkins found that one of the relevant Maryland regulations 
“incorporates by reference the ‘American National Standard for Residential 
Inground Swimming Pools,’” regulations drafted by a swimming pool indus-
try trade group.136  Appendix E to those industry regulations begins with a 
Preamble that states that “[p]rotecting young children from accidental drown-
ings and near-drownings in all aquatic environments . . . is a primary con-
cern.”137  From this Preamble to an Appendix of industry regulations incor-
porated by reference in a Maryland regulation, Judge Adkins finds the 
“specific class”138 that she asserts is protected by the Maryland regulation.  
Let me be clear.  I am not being critical of the Judge.  This contorted analysis 
was evidently what it took to get her colleagues onboard.  A great judge must 
be a brilliant negotiator, as well as someone gifted in analysis and writing 
and able to look beyond the often-parochial perspectives of the hometown 
crowd.  At the same time, Blackburn suggests that attorneys and judges in 
                                                          
 129.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 112, 90 A.3d at 471 (quoting Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 
621).  
 130.  Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 433 Md. 170, 188–94, 70 A.3d 347, 358–61 (2013) (expressing 
concern repeatedly about duties owed to “an indeterminate class of people, known or unknown” 
(quoting Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 750, 955 A.2d 769, 786 (2008))). 
 131.  Id. at 188–89, 70 A.3d at 358.  
 132.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 113, 90 A.3d at 472 (quoting State v. Longeley, 161 Md. 563, 569, 
158 A. 6, 8 (1932)).  
 133.  Id. at 105, 90 A.3d at 467.  
 134.  Id. at 118, 90 A.3d at 474 (quoting MD. CODE REGS. 10.17.01.01 (2010)).  
 135.  Cf. id.  
 136.  Id. at 122, 90 A.3d at 477 (discussing MD. CODE REGS. 10.17.01.04D). 
 137.  Id. at 122–23, 90 A.3d at 477 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MD. CODE REGS. 10.17.01.04D 
app. E at 37).  
 138.  Id. at 125, 90 A.3d at 479.  
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the future have wide berth in seeking an express statement of statutory pur-
pose to benefit a specific class. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Judge Adkins was not the first Court of Appeals judge to espouse an 
understanding of tort law less parochial and backward than what that court 
has often stood for.  Judge Glenn Harrell’s incredibly powerful dissent in 
Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia,139 the contributory negligence deci-
sion, particularly comes to mind.140 
Nor hopefully will she be the last Court of Appeals judge to move Mar-
yland’s tort law in the direction of widely adopted and better-reasoned na-
tional norms.  What Judge Adkins did, in the few years during which she 
focused on tort law, was to make a dent in what was largely a monolithically 
backward body of torts jurisprudence. 
The importance of Judge Adkins’s torts jurisprudence is yet to be de-
cided.  Perhaps especially in these polarized times, the future of Maryland 
tort law should not be a partisan issue.  When I attend nationwide conferences 
of tort scholars, I am often asked, “Does Maryland still have contributory 
negligence?”  When I respond “yes,” leading scholars—whether progressive 
or conservative (admittedly, there are not many of those in legal education)—
are shocked.  In contrast to the Court of Appeals, the supreme courts of con-
servative, predominately Republican states like Kansas, South Carolina, and  
                                                          
 139.  432 Md. 679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013). 
 140.  Id. at 695–738, 69 A.3d at 1158–84 (Harrell, J., dissenting).  
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Texas, often issue opinions that reflect the mainstream legal values articu-
lated in the various iterations of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.141  Mary-
land is long overdue to throw out antiquated tort doctrines that probably 
were quite intentionally designed to keep cases out of the hands of Balti-
more juries. 
Judge Adkins has shown the way.  She has earned her retirement.  It is 
up to the rest of us to pick up the torch she lit. 
                                                          
 141.  See, e.g., Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 318 (Kan. 1994) (abolishing the trichotomy of 
the status of land visitors, that is, invitees, licensees, or trespassers, to determine the standard of care 
owed by a land possessor); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991) (adopt-
ing comparative negligence in South Carolina); El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 314–15 
(Tex. 1987) (adopting dram shop liability in Texas).  
